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Article 7

Book Reviews

Picture Theory: Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation by W. j. T. Mitchell.
Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1994. Pp. xv + 445. $34.95.
Picture Theory might serve as a plump epitome of the Chicago mode of
criticism: elaborate, comprehensive, painfully conscientious (in a footnote
Mitchell thanks a friend for explaining the joke in a famous New Yorker cartoon), and straining to articulate a theory that never quite crystallizes. Mitchell proclaims early and late that "this is a book whose reach far outstrips its
grasp" (8), an "incomplete project" (5), without "a visible architectonic"
(417). Yet on page 100 he asserts "this book is ... a theory." His text, moreover, is carefully divided into sections with structuring introductions a bit
formal for a "collection of snapshots" (5), that he confesses may demonstrate
only "why settled answers of a systematic kind" to what pictures are and
how they relate to words "may be impossible," indeed, that he may have
compiled an introduction to a discipline "that does not exist and never will"
(7). What justifies these inconsistencies, along with the now commonplace
practice of calling a "book" what is mostly a reprinting of essays and talks
from a variety of diverse occasions, is a determination to be "theoretical." It
is "theory," if only unachievable theory, that is satisfied with collecting snapshots rather than struggling to articulate a systematically developmental
study-although some readers may be disappointed when a theory climaxes
with so resounding an affirmation as "the inescapable heterogeniety of representation" (418).
Whether it is the tendency of theorizing to conclude in banality, or the disingenuousness of 1vfitchell's disclaimers, or another calise I haven't identified, something impedes the provocativeness Mitchell patently desires for
Picture Theory. At least for someone like myself who for two decades has
been teaching, thinking, and writing about relations of the verbal and the
visual, Mitchell's contributions, although often in particulars sensible and interesting, are seldom exciting. My sense of splashing about in shallow water
may derive in part from the structuring of most of his essays as responses to
what he rightly sees as unsatisfactory theorizing by other critics-with all
the usual suspects rounded up. He justly conderuns, for example, the vapid
Circularity of "interart" claims of Wendy Steiner, but does little himself to
advance such undertakings.
One reason he can't help me much appears in the chapter "Visible Language: Blake's Art of Writing," an essentially unchanged reprint of a piece
written over a decade ago-which means that it ignores the extraordinary
transformation in Blakean scholarship of the past several years, especially
historical analyses of Blake's engraving! etching practices, some important
results of which have appeared in the splendid Princeton edition edited by
Eaves, Essick, and Viscomi. That this elision of revisonary research is no oversight but a result of his methodology is displayed by Mitchell's positioning
of Blake in opposition to what he terms "romantic antipictorialism." This, he
claims, makes intelligible Blake's "graphocentrism" (117). But Mitchell's representation of Jlromantic antipictorialismJl even he calls "a vast oversimplification" (although one may suspect he underestimates how grossly he distorts). He invokes, for example, Abrams's hoary mirror!Neoclassic-lamp!
Romantic division in the Simplest possible way, ignoring how recent critics,
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particularly those concerned with visual-verbal parallels, have been pointing
out the many reflections and the few lamps appearing in romantic art.
Mitchell further maintains, as if the romantic poets were followers of Pater,
that they employ a "regular comparison of poetry with music" (117), which
suggests he ought to reread, for starters, Wordsworth's Prefaces and Shelley's Defence. Most striking, however, is Mitchell's complete disregard of the
picturesque, that popular, infuriating, yet most revealing socia-artistic phenomenon against which all the romantics, including Blake, at one time or
another defined their artistic purposes and methods, verbal or visual.
Such historical complexities are for Mitchell elidable, because what matters is a rhetorical structure provided by his "vast oversimplification" enabling him to apply his "imagetext" theory to Blake's art. Mitchell's theorizing conunentary, despite re-raising one or two potentially interesting ideas,
such as the possible importance of Blake's pictured scrolls, mystifies central
issues because it distorts the complicated evolution of Blake's art over a very
long career. Mitchell casually leaps, for instance, from the illustrations of Job
in the late 1820s back to Songs of Innocence of 1789, forward to Jerusalem, then
back to The Marriage of Heaven and Hell of the early 1790s. It is as if a Shakespeareian critic h'eated The Tempest and The Comedy of Errors as interchangeable-only worse, because the now well-documented changes in Blake's purposes and practices of designing, printing, and coloring of his "illuminations" are supposed to be Mitchell's principal concern. This indifference to
specific processes of historical evolution is accentuated by slurrings and
blurrings in Mitchell's interpretations. The writing of Jerusalem, he tells us,
Blake offers as "on the same level as the writing of the Ten Commandments
on Mt. Sinai"-which seems dubious in the light of Blake's consistent attitude toward those commandments beginning with The Marriage of Heaven
and Hell, Plates 22-24). Or, to return once more to a problem of "imagetext,"
Mitchell insists on the importance of Innocence being "printed in Roman/'
whereas Experience is "printed in italic," and he goes on to refer to "roman
print" and "italic print." Blake of course printed whole plates: what we see is
italic script or roman script-both are equaly calligraphic. The possible confusion may be trivial, yet symptomatic: Mitchell's imposition of ahistorical
theory about Blake and books leads him to ignore what scholars as diverse
as Darnton and Viscomi have been demonstrating as to how the "book" was
conceived and how it functioned socially at the end of the eighteenth-century. (An obverse and equally trivial but symptomatic detail is Mitchell's
change of an original essay in which he oversimplified the title of Malevich's
famous painting Painterly Realism: Boy with Knapsack-Color Masses in the
Fourth Dimension; his claim (226) that HLis is a "new" title for Suprematist
Composition: Red Square and Black Square arises from his need to justify his
anecdote of viewing the painting, but at the cost of probably misleading
readers as to which was the picture's original title.)
It makes me uncomfortable to write this way of someone with whom my
relations-until now-have been amicable, and ordinarily I would not
bother. Shoddy work in our profession normally sinks quickly to its appropriate level. But Mitchell is the editor of a distinguished journal. If humanistic studies are through self-debasing practices losing esteem both among
other academics and the general public, established professors bear the re-
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sponsibility of rigorously sustaining the credibility of scholarship. There is
lavish docmentation in this book, but too much of it rings of merely politic
citation. One notices that almost never does Mitchell display the true scholar's fascination with the sources of the sources he cites. One can forgive an
assistant professor writing hyperbolically under the insane pressure created
by contemporary theorizers to produce spectacular originality, but it is depressing when someone in Mitchell's position writes, "I know it is heresy to
suggest that Blake could have held any reactionary opinions" (123), the absurdity of the claim in 1994 advertising the intensity of his desire to be seen
as "heretical." In fact, officials who rely on the usual suspects are seldom
heretics of any kind.
It is a relief, then, to turn to another inadequacy in Mitchell's theory of visual representation, because this is one of which I too am guilty. Mitchell, like
most literary critics, is fundamentally insensitive to what goes into the making of pictorial artistry. It is not merely that, as often been said, a writer
moves from concept to percept while a visual artist moves from percept to
concept, but also that visual artistry depends on hand skills, so that evaluations of finished works ought not to be separated from awareness of processes of material production. My awareness of my own incompetence as a
commentator on visual art originated in overhearing the muttered exclamation of my painter companion close to a picture in a gallery we were visiting:
"Now why the hell did he use that kind of oil?"
The need for a sensitivity Mitchell and I lack (along with a surprising
number of art historians, it must be said) is dramatized by Tolstoy'S description of the painter Mihailov in Anna Karenina, who recovers a sketch from his
little daughter and finds it stained by candle grease. Reworking his sketch,
he discovers that the grease spot has revealed the correct pose of a figure he
had previously struggled in vain to draw. Literary critics may not like it, but
this kind of physical accident" is central to visual art. Good criticism of it
ought to begin in an interest in how artifacts are made, what they are made
of, and what physically happened in the creating of them. I think the weakness of Mitchell's discussions not merely of well-known paintings, and his
chapter on the works of Robert Morris, but even his comments on books of
photographs and movies such as Do The Right Thing and JFK, are disappointing, despite some judicious specific observations, because Mitchell has no interest in making processes. He is in this deficiency, I repeat, not unique: too
many film commentators, for example, are unconcerned with what strikes
me as the weird-virtually unbelievable-fashion in which movies are constructed. If Heidegger was right, that only in painting are the full realities of
colors realized, even as only in sculpture do the genuine qualities of stone
appear, one must be suspicious of any theorist of visual representation indifferent to its intrinsic physicalities.
Even more debilitating, but more surprising, is Mitchell's omission of any
reference to orality. Granting that contemporary culture is intensely textual
(as well as visual), it seems odd to relate verbal and visual without admitting that the verbal originates as sound, an aural-invisible-phenomenon.
In the past dozen years, moreover, there has been intense study of oral literatures which should be brought into play here. One may think of scholars
like Ong and Goody, but even a critic such as Bakhtin (whom Mitchell also
II
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ignores), although primarily concerned with the novel, has commented cogently; for instance, on the relevant problem in written texts of intonation.
The problem is that there is no human speech not characterized by specificity of intonations which, exactly because they are not "visible" in a written
text, become interpretive foci in fiction.
The paradox I'm left with is that, although Mitchell speaks frequently of
the difficulty of addressing in language the problem of systematically defining the essence of visual representation, the effect of his determination always to theorize at whatever cost is to diminish belief in his recognition of
the most intractable difficulties in his project. He sees his own principal contribution as an emphasis on what he calls imagetext, recognition that all pictorializations are infected with verbal meanings, and that all writing must be
perceived as containing a pictorial element. True enough, yet this hardly
launches us into intellectual deep water, espeCially when unsupported by
eager breadth of scholarly awareness, despite heavy footnoting and massive
listing of acknowledgments. Notably absent from Mitchell's usual suspects,
to cite one telling example, is Meyer Schapiro, whose old essay "Some Problems in the Semiotics of Visual Art: Field and Vehicle in Image-Signs" happens to have been reprinted just last year. This essay with the modestly elegant specificity of exemplary scholarship illuminatingly explores several of
the basic problems of representation which provoke Mitchell's most laborious manipulation of abstractions.
No doubt my dissatisfactions reveal more about my Alzheimerish incapacity to appreciate the dominant style of contemporary academic criticism than
about what for some readers will seem Picture Theory's accomplishments. I
speak with confidence of my limitations, because when struggling in Chapter Ten with Mitchell's relentless schematizings about illusion, I found my
mind strangely drifting back to a pre-World War I! Charlie Chan movie, in
which I remember the Swedish actor who gave a sort of illusion of a pseudoChinese detective observing in his characteristically fake Confucian manner:
"Theory like mist on eyeglasses. Obscure facts."
Columbia University

Karl Kroeber

The Imprint of Gender: Authorship and Publication in the English Renaissance by
Wendy Wall. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993. Pp. xii + 373. $42.95,
cloth; $17.95, paper.

This is a simply extraordinary first book: its scope and detail are most impressive, as it raises questions about authorship, technology, genre, gender,
class, and politics, while dealing with a number of canonical and noncanonical texts written at a liminal moment in the history of English literature. It is
the time when manuscript circulation of poems and other forms of writing,
with its collective or anonymous creators, was challenged by the existence of
print, the possibility of fixing and monumentalizing a text by a single author.
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Scholars have discussed "the stigma of print," deeply felt by Shakespeare's
contemporaries, for almost fifty years, but it has remained for our time to
investigate the two cultures----manuscript circulation and print-seriously. It
would have been difficult to get New Critics, with their reverence for the
single-authored text, closely read, and the imperative to publish or perish in
the great graduate schools of America, to believe an age in which the social
transactions that attended a poem were more important to its author than
the work itself. But now that the author has dwindled into the author function, books are seen as commodities, and all have audiences who read from

different positions, the issues that Wall addresses are not only thinkable, but
fascinating. It is characteristic of Wall's scholarship that she refers to J. W.
Saunders' article written in 1951, instead of citing just the latest thing from
the new historicists. Her introduction is a full history of how the questions
she addresses and how the approaches she uses have developed in the last
half century. That practice is carried throughout with scrupulous ci!ation of
an enormous body of scholarship.
The class and gender politics of the manuscript-print culture are relatively
simple: the pen is virginal and aristocratic; print is promiscuous and vulgar.
Printing one's works becomes therefore metaphorically public wantoness, a
transgressive act that needed to be negotiated with various strategies. One
was to make sonnet sequences into books to be read as they were circulated
in coteries, as conversations with participation of lover and beloved, as part
of labyrinthine ways of courtship, instead of a clear narrative development.
Printed books retained the trappings of manuscripts. They became pseudomorphs or books which seemed like manuscripts until the authors assumed
sufficient authority to become men in print.
The sonnet cycles also placed the reader in the position of the voyeur in
relation to the text, a position that suits perfectly the gendered rhetoric of
male authors about their printed texts: the text is female; the reader and
writer, male. Thus, Renaissance publishing is constructed as an enticing and
dangerous cultural event, also one in which the male author risks effeminization, as his text is associated with fallen women.
Wall shows how Spenser and Gascoigne used the The Shepherd's Calendar
and A Hundreth Sundrie Flowres to impersonate manuscripts early in their careers, and then went on to claim authority in later works. Daniel and Lodge
use the complaint, joined to a sonnet sequence: they adopt the very voice of
the fallen woman, thereby dislocating gender and blending genres. But all
these transitions are negotiated; few took the way of Ben Jonson, to assert
authority in print for the most scorned of genres, popular plays.
Wall shows, however, how another aristocratic genre, the pageant, when it
is printed, extends its theatricality because what was improvised is inscribed. She demonstrates how two of Elizabeth's courtiers, Sidney and Gascoigne, attempted to coerce their sovereign to take stances favorable to the
author's politics. Both failed, and so the author's intent in the pageant was
foiled. 111en the hoped-for outcome became more securely fixed by the author in print-and certainly monumentalized in the apparatus of the book.
Moreover, print brought with it many more claims of bringing immortality
to an author and to his subject/ object.
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If men were ashamed to seek print, women would bring upon themselves
double shame to publish their work during the Renaissance. Women's negotiations took very conservative forms in this period: mothers published legacies to their children. Mary Sidney, countess of Pembroke, published certain
translations, but never her psalms, which she did prepare to present to the
queen at court. Aemelia Lanyer published Salve Deus Rex Judaeorum in 1611,
imitating some of Sidney's strategies for making her work public. Another
member of the Sidney clan, Lady Mary Wroth, used the strategy of making
the author of her sonnet sequence a fiction from Urania. Each female author
sought her own negotiation within the very narrow band of orthodox behavior.
One learns so much from this book, it seems churlish to criticize, but that
is the task of the reviewer. There is more redundancy in the writing than
necessary. The arguments are complex and very well developed. But conclusions are repeated a bit too often. The two chapters on the sonnet sequences
probably should have been brought together, where the separate points still
could have been clearly made, always granting that both points about the
sequences are extremely valuable. In reading a really good book, one always
ends lusting for more; so I will conclude with gratitude for the smart and
provocative book that Wendy Wall has given us.

Wayne State University

Marilyn L. Williamson

Shepheards Devises: Edmund Spenser's Shepheardes Calender and the Institutions of Elizabeth Society by Robert Lane. Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1993. pp. x + 240. $40.00.
The first thing to be noted about Robert Lane's study is that it pays only
fleeting attention to The Faerie Queene. Although not explicitly stated by
Lane, it soon becomes apparent that he is not interested in tracing the movement of the earlier Shepheardes Calender (1579) to the later Faerie Queene (1592)
as the Virgilian progression from eclogue to epic. Lane is engaged in a rigorous application of an historicist method that examines the material conditions involved in the production and reception of the Shepheardes Calender.
He argues that Spenser's pastoral poem be seen as a radical, oppositionist
work that critiques the "regime" of Elizabeth and two hierarchical institutions of Elizabethan society, the Church and Court. He sets his work against
analyses of the poem that are concerned with seeing the Shepheardes Calender
as inaugurating what has been called the English Renaissance and those
which, through an appropriation of biographical material, envision Spenser
as the poor scholar at Cambridge, engaged in a lifelong quest to ingratiate
himself, through his literary talent, into the patronage circles of an Elizabethan court. He positions his historicist methodology against analyses of the
Calender that treat the aesthetic as a transcendent category, even when it is
considered as historically contingent, as in the recent work of Paul Alpers
("Pastoral and the Domain of Lyric in Spenser's Shepheardes Calender," Representations 12 [1985]) and Nancy Jo Hoffroan (Spenser's Pastorals: "The She-

'I
'1

Criticism, Vol. XXXVII, No.2: Book Reviews

343

pheardes Calender" and "Colin Clout" [Baltimore: Johns HOpkins University
Press, 1977]). He also opposes the type of contextualist analysis of the Calender concerned with the author's biography or with a topical approach to the
allegory of the poem that attempts to assign one-to-one correspondences between Spenser's shepherds and real historical personages. Referring specifically to Paul McLane (Spenser's "Shepheardes Calender": A Study in Elizabethan
Allegory [Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961]), Lane
cites Louis Montrose in calling this kind of investigation literary "detective
work" (Sn.).
After dismissing formalist and old-historicist criticisms of Spenser's poem
quite early in the book, Lane engages recent new historicist work, particularly Stephen Greenblatt's assertion that subversion is always contained and
is, in fact, created by the dominant ideology to legitimate its own entrenched
power. However useful the new historicist project has been as a palliative to
the shortcomings of formalist and old-historicist criticisms, Lane criticizes it
for assuming "a status that elides human initiation, rendering social phenomena as the impersonal operation of social or linguistic entities such as
'power' or 'discursive fields' and society itself, finally, as a monolithic structure in which all differences (especially political resistance) tum out to be
only incidental variants of a single imperative" (7). Above all, it is human
agency that Lane wants to reclaim for Spenser, and his project thus becomes
one of demonstrating that Spenser responds to the circulating discourses of
Elizabethan ideology and challenges that ideology by "using the same resources it draws on to reach very different conclusions" (74).
It is, of course, impossible in this space to delineate the very thorough argument Lane elaborates to support these "different conclusions," but a brief
example should suffice to give a sense of the way he proceeds. During Elizabeth's reign, there was an elaborate image constructed around the Queen as
the "mother" of England. This Umother" image and its association with
"motherly care" was appropriated by Spenser and used to criticize Elizabeth's regime in two of the eclogues. In the April eclogue, Lane finds a jarring, discordant note, in what is generally considered to be a panegyric to
Elizabeth, in the reference to Niobe: "Niobe's combined role as mother and
political ruler has affinities with that other metaphor so familiar to Spenser's
readers, of the queen as mother of England and its people as her children"
(IS). The fact that Phoebus and Cynthia, "Latonaes seede," tum Niobe into
stone because of her excessive pride serves to undermine the ostenSibly laudatory and celebratory tone of the eclogue. In the May eclogue, the metaphor of motherly care is deflated in the fables of a mother goat who abandons her kid for the pursuit of pleasure, unrealistically expecting admonition
to serve in place of education, and the mother ape who inadvertently suffocates her "youngling" in a desire to embrace him too closely. Lane engages
in similar procedures to demonstrate, successfully I think, that Spenser criticized the Church and Court as well. The picture of Spenser that emerges is
consistently one of political resistance.
As further evidence of the Cale11der's subversive nature, Lane cites the
poem's dedication to Sidney (who incurred, in 1579, the disfavor of the
Queen for advising her against her impending marriage to the due d'Alen~on) and its publication by Hugh Singleton, John Stubbs's printer
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(Stubbs forfeited his right hand for publicly doing, in his pamphlet, The Gaping Gulf, what Sidney had done in a private letter). Lane also argues that the
calendrical form itself-like broadsides and ballads, generally considered a
popular medium-and the use of woodcuts to introduce each eclogue for the
benefit of the illiterate mark the poem as an oppositionist work directed to a
broad audience. Recognizing the populist appeal of the Calender forces us to
relinquish the notion that it was written only for courtly aristocrats.
Lane suggests that in the highly-charged political atmosphere of 1579
Spenser had to protect himself from the retribution the Calender's associations with political resistance might have incited. Spenser does this by employing several devices that enable the poem to engage in political commentary while protecting its author from censorship: the poem's anonymity;
commentary of "E.K.," whose reticence or misdirection in glossing certain
passages acts as a signpost to the reader that politically controversial issues
are being addressed; the use of fable as a cultural commonplace in political
critique; and the dialogic structure of the eclogue itself. It might be argued
that the cumulative effect of this extensive filtering of Spenser's political critique is to dull the point Lane makes about Spenser as an agent for change.
It might also be argued that Spenser adopts literary pastoralism as a way to
express sanctioned dissent in order to legitimate hierarchical structures. In
response Lane insists that layers of ambiguity for warding off censorship
were made necessary by repressive Elizabethan institutions, and populist
audiences would have read through the ambiguity, conceiving the pastoral
eclogue as a genre appropriate for voicing real dissent.
Lane reopens the familiar conflict between cultural materialism and new
historicism about the scope of human agency by refuting the new-historicist
description of the function of literary pastoralism. George Puttenham observes that "The Poet devised the Eglogue ... not of purpose to counterfait
or represent the rusticall manner of loves and communication, but under the
vaile of homely persons and in rude speeches to insinuate and glaunce at
greater matters, and such as perchance had not bene safe to have beene disclosed in any other sort." This suggests that the pastoral eclogue was widely
recognized as embodying political critique, and the absence of any systematic crackdown on the authors of pastoral eclogues, by the persons or institutions criticized, implies that pastoral eclogue may have functioned in the
service of the dominant culture, a function best described by Montrose: "The
primarily courtly pastoral of the Renaissance puts into playa symbolic strategy, which, by reconstituting the leisured gentleman as the gentle shepherd,
obfuscates a fundamental contradiction in the cultural logic: a contradiction
between the secular claims of aristocratic prerogative and the religious
claims of common origins, shared fallenness, and spiritual equality among
men, gentle and base alike" ("Of Gentlemen and Shepherds: The Politics of
Elizabethan Pastoral Form," ELH 50 [1983]: 432). Subversive religious egalitarianism, which might have been used politically to oppose aristocratic
privilege, was supposedly defused in the literary pastoral world by poets
whose very participation in the courtly genre of the pastoral eclogue associated them with the aristocracy.
In his analysis of the September eclogue, Lane offers a different description of the function of the pastoral in poetry. He sees Diggon Davie's reports
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of his travels as registering real complaints about "the changing structure of
agrarian relations" (1). Davie's descriptions of "missing chimneys and livestock converted into cash-evoke issues that arose from the transformation
of the countryside by the commercialization of agriculture" (1-2). More importantly and in direct opposition to Montrose, Lane says the September eclogue "incorporates the voices of those we do not expect to find in poetry'the people: the nonelite of Elizabethan society. Their presence here disturbs
any simple identification between serious poetry and a courtly elite or an
aristocratic perspective" (2). This concept of the pastoral is not particular to
the September eclogue; it extends to the Calender in general. Spenser's shepherds are not the literary manifestation of leisured gentlemen, but the voice
of the rustic poor, registering complaints about Elizabethan institutions.
In response to Montrose's argument, in '''Eliza, Queene of shepheardes,'
and the Pastoral of Power" (ELR 10 [1980]: 163), that the pastoral served the
interests of the hierarchical social order, Lane suggests that "Spenser was
opposing himself (if only prophetically) to the mainstream of Elizabethan
pastoral" and "the Calender stands as a dramatic exception to this claim"
(83). It is stimulating to see the Calender as an exception, to see Spenser making his literary debut as a radical critic of the established order, and Lane
makes it possible to do just that. Lane says that his "work emphasizes social
and political institutions and practices because their elucidation is necessary
for an understanding of the Calender, but those dynamics were registered
and mediated-whether wholly consciously or not-by a writer we know as
Edmund Spenser. None of that social experience, or the cultural resources he
brought to bear on it in this poem, originated with him, but he perceived it,
worked to understand it, and responded to it, crafting its articulation in order to communicate it-to represent it-in a particular way, all with a view
toward reshaping the society of which those dynamics were constituent elements" (7). He thus provides a way to accommodate cultural-materialist
claims for human agency to new-historicist claims that discursive fields create and contain that agency.

I'

Wayne State University

I

Tim Montbriand

The Snowflake on the Belfty: Dogma and Disquietude in the Critical Arena by
Anna Balakian. BlOOmington: Indiana University Press, 1994. Pp. xiv + 270.
$39.95.

This important collection of 19 essays includes a series of lectures that Balakian gave during a 3-week appointment as Visiting Fellow at the Institute
for the Humanities of Indiana University. The subject of these essays is Balakian's judicious commentary and captivating thoughts on the relatively recent developments in the Held of literary criticism, developments that include deconstruction, post-structuralism, multiculturalism, and other literary
approaches that have insisted on adhering to political agendas and radical
ideologies. VVhat Balakian strives to do in these discussions is not so much to
debate the validity of the politics or the ideological soundness of the meth-
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ods in question, but for the most part simply to examine systematically the
effects that these radical methods have had on the classroom teaching and
study of literature.
There is probably no one better qualified than Anna Balakian to take up
the heated debate that is now raging ill academic departments of literature,
most particularly in departments of comparative literature, where the new
methodologies have been embraced with the greatest enthusiasm. Balakian
is famous for her extensive and ground-breaking studies on surrealism and
symbolism, and she can boast of having rubbed elbows with some of the
great artistic and literary legends of our time. Her book, Literanj Origins of
Surrealism, first published in 1947, includes a frontispiece that is an original
drawing by Yves Tanguy, which he created for her book at the end of his life
while reSiding in COlmecticut. Balakian personally interviewed Andre Breton
in his Greenwich Village apartment in New York City during h.is self-imposed exile of World War II. Her long career as a scholar and professor of
comparative literature has given her a unique perspective on the vicissitudes
and the cataclysmic changes that have been wrought in the past few decades
in the area of literary criticism. In short, she is one of few scholars who have
the credentials and the experience, not to mention the courage, to take on a
debate that for many is just too fraught with political contentiousness. She
has entered into the literary fracas as a calm, level-headed, and shrewd observer, from whom we have much to learn.
In these essays, as Balakian questions the veracity of Derrida, Foucault,
Lacan, and others, she persuasively argues that the faddish popularity of
these ideologues has now established a stranglehold on academic departments of literature that has done little to enhance the canon or the curriculum, and perhaps has done much to cause damage. In her introductory essay, "By Way of Entry into the Fray: 111e Critics and Their Authors," Balakian chronicles the first stirrings of her alarm in April 1970, while
attending a colloquium on the new novel in Strasbourg, France. There she
heard a struchlralist, whose name she does not give, but to whom she refers
as "the man in the dark glasses," declare that there was no such thing as an
author, that there was only writing, and that the literary work has written itself using the author only as a medium. Thus, the reception of a literary text
by the reader gained paramount importance, and the aesthetic value of the
text as carefully crafted by the author was of almost no importance. To Babkian's horror, no one contested the arguments of the structuralist at the colloquium, who \vas allowed to voice his comments after every paper, and
there seemed to be palpable a general air of defeat among many of the participants. In this short but powerful introductory essay, Balakian establishes
her deep reservations, and for the rest of the book she effectively refutes "the
man in the dark glasses."
The question of aesthetics is examined again in more depth in the essay,
"The Snowfbkc on the Belfry: The Aesthetic Dimension in Literary Criticism." Balakian chastises the critics of the new methodologies for flagrantly
ignoring the aesthetic dimension of the literary text. The belief in the exaggeratcd importance of the reader in the reception of the text, \vhich strips the
tc'd of its personal PZlst and forces it to be regarded as a product of a collecti\'t.~ unconscious, is one to be yiewed with suspicion. Not only is the author
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disowned, but the author's personal style has ceased to be a factor in the aesthetic value of the literary work. After unloading the aesthetic baggage, the
semiologist can presumably view the text in its raw linguistic state, conducting a scientific investigation of its cornmon denominators, which approaches,
as Balakian notes, "the type of knowledge one can glean from myth, archetypes, or paradigms" (15). Divested of its aesthetic value, Balakian wonders
if the literary text is not being treated in much the same way as a social document that merely presents information. She also comments that the attempt
to nullify the unique history of the literary text, as well as that of the author,
results in nothing less than an attempt "to undermine Western culture by
deleting the validity of its referential role in literature" (19).
In the essay entitled "Multiculturalism: The Case of Surrealism/' Balakian
describes a form of multiculturalism that is different from the one presently
being touted in academia. Using surrealism as her example, she di.scusses
the history of an international literary movement that included both familiar
and unfamiliar literatures, and that strove to stress what was common to all
the national literatures rather than what was different. This successful struggle to universalize a literary movement was based on international communism and spread to nearly every part of the globe. Balakian points out the
multiplicity of nationalities among some noted surrealists: the Czech Viteslav Nezval, the Yugoslav Marco Ristich, the Swede Max Walter Svanberg,
and the Japanese Takiguchi, among others, including the many surrealists of
Latin America, where the movement had its most electrifying effect. She
notes how the fraternal and unifying forces of the surrealist brand of multiculturalism were much different from the divisive forces of the current
brand, where one sees" abject chauvinism, with each subculture fighting for
its day in the sun" (131).
In her last three essays, "Quality Control in the Teaching of Literature,"
"Canon Harassment," and "Literary Theory and Comparative Uterature/'
Balakian sums up her concerns about the sometimes paralyzing effects of the
new methods and ideologies on the classroom teaching of literature and the
classroom curriculum. She reiterates her concern about aesthetics; she questions the wisdom of using the tools of the anthropologist and the sociologist
for the analysis of literary texts; she is disturbed by the contrived manipulation of the traditional canon; and she voices her uneasiness about the unclear
definition of "influence," fearing that influence studies may be replaced by
studies of intertextuality, and studies of literary fortune may be replaced by
reader reception theories.
There is undoubtedly much here to argue about, to debate, to consider
and reconsider. But it is important that this alternate viewpoint become
more widely disseminated, that the voice of doubt be heard in literature departments across the continent. It is probably safe to say that this book is
mandatory reading for anyone who has ever taught literature in the college
classroom and for anyone who has ever seriously studied it.

Montreal, Quebec
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Foregone Conclusions: Against Apocalyptic History by Michael Andre Bernstein.
Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1994, Pp. xiii
+ 181. $22.00.
Michael Andre Bernstein proposes a theory of reading that celebrates " ...
the radical freedom of human beings from any kind of determinism" (1).
This "radical freedom" is achieved by substituting the practice of "sideshadowing" for "foreshadowing" as a method of reading texts and the-worldas-text. Sideshadowing is ". . . a gesturing to the side, to a present dense
with multiple, and mutually exclusive, possibilities for what is to come....
Sideshadowing stresses the significance of random, haphazard, and unassimilable contingencies, and instead of the power of the system to uncover an
otherwise unfathomable truth, it expresses the ever-changing nature of that
truth and the absence of any predictive certainties in human affarrs" (1, 4).
The theory is a combination of soft deconstructionism in literature and watered down Emersonism as applied to life. Truth is not non-existent, only relentlessly fluid, and life, if not a bowl of cherries, is at least a cornucopia of
infinite possibilities. In an essay published seventy years before Bernstein's
book, T. E. Hulme discussed the romantic and classical views of human
beings by saying that, "To the one party man's nature is like a well, to the
other like a bucket. The view which regards man as a well, a reservoir full of
possibilities, I call the romantic; the one which regards him as a very finite
and fixed creature, I call the classical." Bernstein's theory clearly places him
among those who advocate the romantic view.
Bernstein's decision to use the Holocaust as a test case for his theory of a
radical freedom achieved by viewing the world through sideshadowing
lenses constitutes another instance of the recent tendency by deconstructionists in academia to co-opt the Holocaust. Bernstein is not unaware of potential difficulties: "To have chosen to confront the claims of sideshadowing
with the enormity of the Shoah," he writes, "is to test it against a seemingly
intractable counter-instance, on the principle that if the validity of sideshadowing can be discerned here, where it seems so difficult to recognize, then
its pertinence in cases that are not as morally and theoretically arduous will
be more readily apparent" (13-14).
Awareness of potential difficulties, however, does not enable Bernstein to
recognize his own offense in the clause, "to confront the claims of sideshadowing with the enormity of the Shoah," his academic vanity preventing
him from recognizing the parodic grotesquerie of setting the scientistic academic coinage uSideshadowing" alongside what was once an emotive phrase

but has now become an academic cliche, "enormity of the Shoah." Bernstein's trivialization is all the more ironic in that he later observes that ". .. it
is all too easy to think of representations of the Shoah whose lapses into

tastelessness and exploitation are deeply offensive, and which, in their vulgarity, risk coarsening the collective memory" (52). The beam in one's own
eye is indeed difficult to detect.
Bernstein's claim to be conducting an experiment in which he tests the
"claims of sideshadowing" against "the enormity of the Shoah" is doubly
disingenuous. First, the claim is diSingenuous because we know all along
that Bernstein is not testing anything at all. We know the "seemingly intract-
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able counter-instance" will have to yield to "the claims of sideshadowing:'
because all Bernstein has to do to make the one yield to the other is manipulate words in the requisite way. Secondly, the claim is disingenuous because
Bernstein is actually using "sideshadowing" and the Holocaust to promote
the underlying political agenda of discrediting Zionism as a totalizing ideology by establishing the claim that "Zionism" has perverted the Holocaust to
its own narrow nationalist needs. Since so many Israelis are Holocaust survivors and children of survivors, the symbiosis between Israel and the Holocaust is extremely complex and emotionally wrenching. I cannot possibly
deal with such complexities in the space allotted here, but the point is that
Bernstein does not deal with them in his book either. He presents a ridiculously simplistic scenario in which "Zionist ideology" exploits the victimhood of the victims for one set of purposes and the heroism of the Jewish resistance fighters for another set of purposes. Though the question of the relationship of the Israeli present to the Holocaust past has been the subject of
innumerable discussions in the Israeli press and Israeli journals, Bernstein
develops his two-pronged Zionist/Holocaust agenda on the basis of only a
few second hand academic articles, and never deals with a single original
source.
It would be impossible to unpack all of the complex issues that Bernstein
has presented in simplistic terms, but I would like to address myself to two
specific issues he raises. The first issue is the representation of Jewish resistance movements under Nazi occupation, and may be called a problema tics
of reality and imagination. The second is the fictional representation of the
Holocaust by a survivor, and may be called a problematics of literature and
history.
In highly oversimplified terms, Bernstein presents the image of a Zionist
ideology that sought to foster the myth of the fighting Jew in the Israeli
imagination by narratizing and commemorating Jewish resistance movements during the Holocaust as clearly motivated heroic acts. "Thus," he
writes "the fighters of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising, or of the Sobibor and
Birkenau revolts, have become crucial in the post-war Jewish, and more particularly, in the Israeli imagination, as proof of a new Jewish readiness to
strike back against their oppressors." In a SCholarly book dealing with a topic
as widely discussed as the place of Jewish resistance movements in the Israeli imagination, we would expect the author to supply supporting evidence, and to discuss psychological, sociological, and historical studies, as
well as journals, diaries, and literary accounts, SUd1 as novels, poems, and
stories about Jewish uprisings that reflect this allegedly crucial influence on
the Israeli imagination. But in support of his all-encompassing claim, Bernstein cites only one gossipy comment from a secondary essay.
Bernstein next undertakes to undermine the Zionist myth of heroic Jewish
resistance by deconstructing the actual uprisings. "Like the plot of a classical
tragedy," he writes,
U,e uprisings against the Nazis took place in a restricted space and
time, and the fighters seem tragically heroic to us because we know
how they perished and Ums we can grasp the beginning and end of
each uprising as a single event, fixed in a clear progression of linked
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episodes. But while it was actually happening, it was experienced instant by instant and person by person, each with different motives and
inspirations for fighting, and each with differently formulated explanations of his own involvement.
Since Bernstein attributes so much importance to narrative strategies one
would have expected him to specify which narratives he feels have misrepresented Jewish uprisings in tragic-heroic terms. But haVing suggested that
Jewish Resistance narratives misrepresent what actually happened, he does
not cite a single mythologizing narrative, nor a single first-hand narrative,
nor a single account by a historian of Jewish resistance movements (such as
Shmuel Krakowski, Nechama Tec, Aaron Nirensztein).
In fact, the uprisings were not as unmotivated as Bernstein claims. Historically, there were often several (but far from infinite) motivating factors hotly
debated among and within resistance groups: namely, whether their primary
goal should be to save as many Jews as possible, to avenge the wanton murder of Jews by killing Germans, or to save Jewish honor by fighting in a battle the fighters knew they had no hope of winning, just to show that all Jews
did not go "like sheep to the slaughter." A historian of the Krakow Ghetto
Resistance, Aaron Nirensztein, cites testimony that there was a split between
two factions in the Akiva Resistance Movement in the Krakow Ghetto. One
faction held that" . . . we must use our resources to rescue as many of our
people as possible," while a second maintained that ", .. our resources are so
meager and trivial, that what we have to do above all else is to save Jewish
honor, to fight for the sake of fighting, and to die as heroes."! Another historian of Jewish resistance movements, Shmuel Krakowski, writes of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising that "It was understood that this would be a special
kind of revolt..
It was necessary to prepare for an uprising that was
doomed to defeat from its onset. ... "2
As to Bemsein's contention that "while it was actually happening, it was
experienced instant by instant and person by person, each with different motives and inspirations for fighting, and each with differently formulated explanations of his own involvement," to the extent that no mo individuals
are perfectly identical, the deconstructionist description may be accurate. But
the implication that the fighters were unmotivated particles floating in space
is existentially and historically false, and is sharply contradicted by Gusta
Davidson Draenger, a resistance fighter in the Krakow Ghetto, in her Pamientnik JIIstyny (Justyna's Dian;), written in 1943, while the struggle was still
taking place. 3 Gusta reproduces a Sabbath-evening speech by one of the
leaders of the Resistance, Adolph Liebeskind, in which he tells the young
people assembled around him (most in their teens): "We're on a one-way
journey with no return. The road we've chosen to travel is the road to death.
Remember that. Anybody who joined us in the hope of improving his
chances of survival should know that's not what we're about." Liebeskind's
idealistic fatalism is a far cry from Bernstein's armchair theorizingl For the
Jewish resistance fighters in the Krakow Ghetto, the sideshadowed "present
dense with multiple, and mutually exclusive, possibilities for what is to
come" would have been a grotesque joke. The point is, that Bernstein's contention that the Jewish Resistance movements have been mythified is worthf
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less because he takes no pains whatever to establish a "historical reality"
that would undermine the alleged myth.
But what may be most disturbing in Bernstein's formulation is that in "atomizing" the Resistance fighters to promote his political agenda, he not only
deconstructs their identities as individuals, but also removes the possibility
of making any moral distinctions. Consider a re-narratizing of Bernstein's
story line that would re-arrange some of the nouns to read as follows:
Like the plot of a classical tragedy, the "aktzias" against the Jews took
place in a restricted space and time, and the SS troopers seem diabolically evil to us because we know how they murdered their victims and
thus we can grasp the begirming and end of each aktzia as a single
event, fixed in a clear progression of linked episodes. But while it was
actually happening, it was experienced instant by instant and person
by person, each with different motives and inspirations for murdering
victims, and each with differently formulated explanations of his own
involvement.
The narrative atomization of the human form that Bernstein engages in to
deconstruct the "Zionist mythology" of the Jewish resistance fighters, and to
remove any sense of tragedy from their plight, equally removes all moral responsibility from the SS men who were committing mass murder for the
sake of insuring racial purity. If the Jewish resistance fighters were merely
unmotivated particles engaged in a random series of contingent acts, then so
were the murderers. All behavior, then, is contingent, non-motivated, and
immune to moral assessment. Non-determined (unforeshadowed) Jew particles and non-determined SS particles happened to float into the same space
and the Jew particles disappeared.
Having disregarded historical texts and all first-hand accounts in his theorizing about the Holocaust as history, Bernstein introduces "history" into
two chapters he spends misreading the fiction of Aharon Appelfeld. Appelfeld's novel Badenheim 1939 portrays a group of assimilated middle-class
Austro-German Jews existing aimlessly in a resort town, apparently as the
final stage of the German genocide against the Jews is about to commence.
The characters are in a state of deep denial of the realities surrounding them,
and they either refuse to, or cannot, acknowledge the ominous signals of disaster that constantly bombard their senses. As has often been pointed out,
the novel is Kafkaesque, surrealistic, poetic, allegorical, but Bernstein is morally outraged both by the historical inaccuracy of the novel and by what he
takes to be Appelfeld's unfair hit on Austro-German Jews.
"The behavior of the vacationers in Badenheim," Bernstein writes, "is not
just self-deceiving; it is also largely Appelfeld's own fantasy, belied by the
pervasive terror that gripped Austrian Jewry within hours of the A11schluss"
(66). Bernstein's asssertion is so absurd it relutes iself. What does he think
"the behavior" of the characters in any \\fork of fiction is if not the "fantasy"
of the writer, \vhether that "fantasy" is presented as "realism" or allegory?
How can events "belie" a text which does not claim to be a chronicle of
events in the first place? But at any rate, as we shall see, he is not even correct in his characterization of the affective center of the novel.
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Bernstein's inability to apprehend the affective center of the novel leads
him to accuse Appelfeld of blaming Austro-German Jews for their own destruction, an accusation that exposes not only Bernstein's ineptitude as a
reader but his simplistic understanding of the Holocaust. The gist of Bernstein's argument is that the reader, who realizes these decadent assimilated
Jews are about to be enveloped by the Nazi genocide while they do not, is
led by the narrator (Appelfeld himself?) to pass the most severe judgment on
the Jewish characters in the novel, and therefore on actual Austro-German
Jews. "By never mentioning the Nazis directly, but by representing the Jews
of Badenheim as irredeemably selfish and petty:' Bernstein concludes, Appelfeld " ... commits the ... offense of leaving unchallenged the monstrous
proposition that Europe's Jews are somehow 'deserving' of punishment"
(66).
It is difficult to pinpoint "this monstrous proposition," which Bernstein at-

tributes to the fact that Appelfeld writes in the vein of foreshadowing rather
than sideshadowing, anywhere in the novel. Certainly, it is not a proposition
ever stated in the novel, or by Appelfeld himself outside the novel. And
even if it were accurate to suggest that the Nazis don't playa significant role
in the novel because they are never "mentioned directly," I believe a reasonable reader uncommitted to a narrow theory of "sideshadowing" would not
infer from the novel the moral that "Europe's Jews" deserved to be exterminated. Even supposing a completely naive reader unable to distinguish between JlEurope's Jews" and Badenheim's Jews, what scale of justice would
that reader have to use to arrive at the conclusion that average human
beings guilty of nothing worse than lack of foreSight and inability to act decisively "are deserving" of being exterminated like vermin?
Bernstein has arrived at this bizarre conclusion by taking over the observation of earlier commentators that the reader does not see any Nazis portrayed directly, and then extending that observation to mean that since we
read only about Jews in the novel, they must be to blame for their own destruction. Hence, he concludes that " ... it is difficult not to include the author of Badenheim 1939 ... among those 'prominent Jews' ... [alluded to by
Appelfeld in an interview with Philip Roth] who make 'harsh comments'
about the victims of the Shoah. Even the most assimilated and self-denying
Jews were still sufficiently Jewish to be murdered, and so the contempt of a
novel like Badenheim 1939 is just as 'anti-Semitic' in its attribution of complicity as are the harshest judgments of the unnamed 'prominent Jews' " (72).
But the "contempt" for the Jewish characters in Badenheim 1939 resides in
Bernstein's own heart, not in Appelfeld's novel. And the charge that the Jews
were complicitous in their own destruction is Bernstein's, not Appelfeld's.
Bernstein can find contempt in the novel only because he knows very little
about Holocaust literature, and because he does not have a clue to understanding survivor sensibility. In an essay entitled, "A Plea for the Dead:' in
Legends of Our Time, Elie Wiesel has written, "[ plead for the dead, and [ do
not say they are innocent; that is neither my intention nor aim. I say simply
we have no right to judge them; to confer innocence upon them is already to
judge them. I saw them die and if I feel the need to speak of gUilt, it is always of my own that I speak. I saw them go away and I remained behind.
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Often I do not forgive myself for that." It is exactly this survivor sensibility
that motivates Appelfeld, a sensibility Bernstein does not comprehend.
Badenheim 1939, then, is far from being an "anti-Semitic" novel. The Jewish
characters portrayed by Appelfeld are pathetic, and perhaps tragic, but certainly not contemptible to any reader who understands the novel. The narrator makes clear that these characters do not belong to the top echelon of assimilated Austro-Gennan Jews (the Warburgs, for example); they are, rather,
people in comfortable circumstances, but not the wealthiest and most powerful German Jews. The spa at Badenheim is clearly a second-rate place that
does not attract the elite, even in the assimilated Jewish population. This
much is apparent in Appelfeld's portrayal of the impresario, Dr. Pappenheim, and in the fact that the entertainment at Badenheim is second rate because top performers won't come there. The pervasive tone of the novel is
not contempt but terror, the terror of people trapped like animals sensing
they are being led to the slaughter, but not knowing what they can do to
avert the catastrophe they feel is coming. If Bernstein had been able to get
beyond his theory he would have seen that Appelfeld portrays with great
artistry what Bernstein himself has described as "the pervasive terror that
gripped Austrian Jewry within hours of the Anschluss." Their consciousness
of being trapped, and the ensuing terror, begins to influence the behavior of
the vacationing Jews, as should be apparent to any sensitive reader. They are
not angels to begin with, only humans. That is exactly Appelfeld's point. But
they don't deserve to be exterminated just for being human, and they descend into a deeper aimlessness and decadence as they begin to sniff their
own powerlessness and impending anniliilation.
Appelfeld's not mentioning Nazis directly is testimony to his brilliance as
a novelist, not the moral blemish that Bernstein contends. If it is true that
Nazis are not mentioned, it is also true that Germans and German bureaucracy are a pervasive presence in the novel. For some unknown, and therefore ominous, reason, all Jews are required to register with the Sanitation
Department. A shadowy Sanltation Department inspector is ubiquitous in
the novel, and his presence, while mild, nevertheless strikes fear into the
hearts of the Jews. All the inhabitants, vacationers, and performers in Badenheim are stained with some kind of physical or neurotic illness, and we are
led to infer that the sickness and decadence are somehow related to a European, and perhaps specifically German, high culture that provides no deterrent to the coming destruction. Appelfeld has captured to perfection the
chilling contrast between the serene relentlessness of the bureaucratic killing
process and the paralyzing terror of the victims.
A fly leaf following the title page of Foregone Conclusions identifies the volume as n A Centennlal Book," one of a hundred to be "published between
1990 and 1995 ... as an example for the Press's finest publishing and bookmaking traditions." While this is indeed a beautifully made book with a very
handsome dust cover, it is, ironically, a book so puerile in its theorizing, so
shoddy in its scholarship, so inept as literary commentary, so blatantly insensitive in its handling of moral and ethical questions, and so misleading in
its oversimplification of complex issues, that it reflects shame not only on its
author, but on the Press and on the editors of the series in which it is a vol-
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ume, "Contraversions: Critical Studies in Jewish Literature, Culture, and Society."
Brown University
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